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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MORTGAGE INVEST~1ENT CO., 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
i Plaintiff-Respondent, , 
\Case No. 
vs. 10311 
SPENCER W. TOONE, 
Def end ant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CO., INC. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the assignee of a 
seller in a Uniform Real Estate Contract against a 
buyer for delinquent payments due under the contract. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
On December 17, 1964, Plaintiff moved the court 
for a Summary Judgment on the grounds that there 
was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This motion was based on the pleadings on file in the 
subject case and the deposition of the Defendant. The 
court took the matter under advisement and on De-
cember 22, 1964 rendered judgment against Defendant 
and in favor of Plaintiff, for the unpaid payments, at-
torney's fees and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judg-
ment rendered against Defendant-Appellaz.it on De-
cember the 22nd, 1964. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December the 6th, 1962, the Defend-
ant, Mr. Toone, executed as buyer a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. In December of 1962, Mr. 
Toone came to Plaintiff's office at the request of Greg-
erson, President of Plaintiff, R37-7. Before Plain-
tiff purchased the subject contract, Mr. Gregersen 
wished to see and talk with the purchaser, R37-3. 
Plaintiff purchased the contract from the seller thereon 
and was assigned the seller's interest, R-31. The 
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contract provided for two payments a year, one in 
May and one in October .'The May payment of ap-
proximately $3,925.00 became due and was not paid 
and Plaintiff filed an action against Mr. Toone on 
June the 26th, 1963, RI. After the action was com-
menced, Mr. Toone came to Plaintiff's office to request 
time in which to make the first payment, R37-8. Plain-
tiff agreed that Mr. Toone could have a certain time 
in which to pay $1,500.00 of the payment or file an 
answer, R37-8 & 9. The time requested by Mr. Toone 
expired and the Default Certificate of Mr. Toone. 
was entered on August the 13th, 1963, R3. Ten days 
later, R4, judgment by default against Mr. Toone was 
taken by the Plaintiff, R4. Mr . Toone retained coun-
sel and motion was made to set aside the default 
judgment, R5, which motion was granted on Septem-
ber 26, 1963, R7, and Defendant was allowed an 
extra ten days in which to file an answer. On October 
the 8th, 1963 another default judgment was entered 
against Defendant in this matter, RIO. A stipulation 
was entered into between counsel on December the 
2nd, 1963, RI8, and on December 13th, 1963, pur-
suant to this stipulation, an Order was entered setting 
aside the second default judgment. On December 
the 17th, 1964, a pre-trial conference was held before 
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, R-21. At this 
time Plaintiff moved for a Summary Judgment based 
upon the pleadings on file and the deppsition of Mr. 
Toone. The court took the matter under advisement, 
R23, and on December 22nd, 1964 Judgment was 
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entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 
' R25. From this Judgment Defendant appeals. 
ARGUlVlENT 
I. The facts essential to Plaintiff-Respondent's 
claim against Defendant-Appellant are undisputed. 
Mr. Toone admits in his answer, Rl9, that he ex-
ecuted the subject contract as buyer; however, he de-
nies "for lack of knowledge" Plaintiff's allegation of 
assignment. The Affidavit of R. George Gregersen, 
R31, is evidence of the said assign~ent and nowhere 
does Defendant deny the assignment. The first three 
pages of the deposition of Defendant, Mr. Toone, 
R37, set the tone for the studied evasion of Defend-
ant throughout this lawsuit. Although Mr. Toone is 
less than open in his deposition for many pages, as 
pointed out in Appellant's brief, he "suspected" the 
assignment. Mr. Toone admitted in his deposition that 
he had not paid any money under the subject contract: 
(page 6, line 14 through 24) 
"Q. (By Mr. Amoss) Mr. Toone, do you owe 
any money on that contract? Well, let's put 
it this way, have you made any payments 
under this contract? 
A. No. 
Q. There is no question you signed the contract, 
is there, you don't deny that? 
A. No. 
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Q. Now the payments called for are set forth 
in the contract, are they not? 
A. (No response) . 
Q. You haven't ma<le any payments to anyone 
under the contract? (Emphasis supplied). 
A. No." 
Simple computations show that the amount awarded 
under the judgment appealed from hereunder by the 
Third District Court is correct. 
2. The record fails to disclose facts to substantiate 
defense raised by Mr. rPoone in his answers. 
As an affirmative defense, Mr. Toone alleged 
"that the interest that he acquired in the contract which 
is the subject of this action has been been assigned to 
a third party, 0. A. Tatro, and the obligation of mak-
ing payments on the said contract are those of the said 
0. A. Tatro and not the obligation of this Defendant." 
Defendant in his Affidavit dated August the 23rd, 
1963, R-6, stated "that since he entered into the con-
tract described in the complaint herein, he has assigned 
all of his title and interest in same to 0. A. Tatro of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and which party should also 
be made a part of this lawsuit as the party required 
to perform under the contract in view of the assign-
ment to him." The assignment, if any existed, was 
obviously made after the execution by Defendant of 
the subject contract. Nowhere in the pleadings or De-
fendant's deposition is the faintest hint that Plaintiff 
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had any knowledge of the supposed assignment, until 
Appellant's brief, where all sorts of vague, but some-
how naughty things are darkly hinted at. It is Horn-
book law that an assignor cannot assign liabilities. 
3. The record fails to disclose facts to substantiate 
def ens es raised at the pre-trial conference. 
At the pre-trial conference Defendant raised sev-
eral new and interesting defenses: (I) "There was 
no consideration given for the execution of the con-
tract. It is the Defendant's position that since Defend-
ant paid nothing upon the execution of the same there 
was no consideration"; (2) "That there is another 
outstanding agreement covering the same property 
between the same parties and it is not clear which of 
the two contracts is pertinent as far as any cause of 
action between the parties is concerned," and ( 3) "The 
Plaintiff well knew during all the time set out in the 
complaint herein and amended complaint that the De-
fendant was not the true buyer of the property, that 
he was acting for a third party and that the action 
should include him as a party Defendant." 
Defendant's first contention is so assinine that no 
comment need be made thereon. 
The next defense is quite preposterous when 
viewed in light of the admissions contained in the 
record. While attempting to fathom whatever defense 
there might conceivably be, Plaintiff learned for the 
first time while taking Defendant's deposition that 
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Defendant's counsel was in possession of two contracts 
purporting to sell the same property by the same seller 
to the same buyer, R-37-11 et sequiter. This was 
done for the purpose of "Manipulation," R-37-15, 
although what or who was to be ma~ipulated was not 
explained by Defendant. The existence of the second 
contract was not made known to the Plaintiff, R-37-
13. As a matter of fact, Defendant's deposition would 
seem to indicate that far from being a defense, the 
matter of the two contracts indicates that all parties 
concerned, with the exception of Plaintiff, i.e., officers 
of the seller corporation, Defendant buyer and the 
ubiquitous Mr. Tatro, were quite closely connected 
and one might even say "thick." 
Now here in the record could even the wildest imag-
ination snatch statements out of context that would 
support Defendant's third contention at the pre-trial 
as set forth above. 3 Am. Jur. 2d 575, Section 192, 
states the well-established law of Agency governing 
this set of facts: 
"If there is no proper indication in the instru-
ment that the person signing does so as agent, 
that is, if the principal's name does not appear 
in the instrument as principal of the person 
signing, the agent is personally liable on a con-
tract signed in his own name. Even where an 
agent discloses the name of his principal, if he 
signs a contract in his own name only, he will 
be personally bound thereby where the contract 
does not show upon its face that he is acting for 
another." 
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4. The record fails to disclose facts to substantiate 
defenses raised on Appeal. 
A. Upon Appeal, Appellant raised for the first 
time the point that Plaintiff did not actually prove that 
Defendant had actual knowledge of the assignment 
from seller to Plaintiff. 
The record is replete with admissions that Appel-
lant had actual knowledge of the claimed assignment 
between the seller and Respondent. As pointed out 
above, the Affidavit of Mr. Gregersen on behalf of 
the Plaintiff, R-31, was evidence in the record of 
said assignment. Defendant in his deposition admits 
that at Plaintiff's request a meeting was held in Plain-
tiff's office. On page four of his deposition Mr. Toone 
"suspected" that the subject contract had been pur-
chased by the Plaintiff. Amply aided by counsel, De-
fendant was able to side step the questions put to him 
for four or five pages, however, he does admit, that 
after "suspecting" that the contract had been assigned 
to Plaintiff by Northwestern Investment Corporation, 
he had approached Plaintiff for more time to make a 
payment. Mr. Toone's statements in his Affidavit, 
R-6, his position clearly set forth in the answers filed 
by him, and his statements in the deposition leave no 
room for an inference that Mr. Toone meant to make 
a payment to anyone other than Plaintiff and in fact 
the record makes crystal clear the fact that there was 
no doubt in Mr. Toone's mind that Plaintiff was the 
party to whom payments should have been made. 
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B. Upon Appeal, Appellant raised for the first 
time the ingenious defense of N ovation. 
In Appellant's brief on appeal we learn for the 
first time that Appellant has decided to try a new 
defense and aptly termed it N ovation. If it were not 
indeed a very serious matter to one's client to have a 
matter on Appeal, this argument of Appellant's would 
be ludicrous to the nth degree. Appellant in effect 
states that if there had been a novation in this matter 
there would have been a novation. Appellant with 
lowered eyebrows darkly refers to "several inferences 
that support a N ovation, (I) "the apparent under-
standing of Appellant that he was a mere nominee 
and would not be liable on assignment," (I again refer 
this Court to R-6, the Affidavit of Mr. Toone, "that 
since he entered into the contract described herein, he 
has assigned all his right, etc.", ( 2) "the fact that 
Respondent was apparently involved along with Tatro 
in the original negotiation." (Is counsel referring to 
the meeting held in the off ices of Plaintiff after suit 
had been filed, R-37-8, or does counsel know more 
of the original negotiation than he would allow his 
client to testify upon deposition?); (3) "the fact that 
two contracts were executed. The latter fact itself could 
be the basis for a novation and preclude an action on 
the instant contract." (Counsel must mean the two 
contracts executed the same day for the sale of the same 
property between the same parties, but the sales price 
of one being $39,500.00 and the sales price of the second 
being $13,500.00 greater, which "manipulation" Mr. 
11 
Toone was involved in up to his eyebrows and which 
fact was not revealed to Plaintiff, R-37-13.) That 
this extraordinary set of facts should be brazenly pressed 
upon this court as grounds for suspicion of a novation, 
and therefore a defense to the contract, needs far more 
gall than existed even in Caesar's time. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that this Court should afford 
Appellant the right to have the factual basis of his 
claims determined. "The record as it now exists is at 
best sketchy and obscure." This writer submits that the 
record, in so far as it provides facts to support Appel-
lant's defenses, is neither sketchy nor obscure - the 
facts are non-existent. The record shows a straight-
forward case of a purchaser under a contract who could 
not make payments. The trial court quite rightly con-
cluded that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment in the 
amount of the payments due. The only defenses dredged 
up by Appellant from time to time have been either 
preposterous under the law or mere inuendo. There is 
nothing in the record to aid the Appellant's grasp at 
stra.ws. "We do not feel that Appellant can be per-
mitted to draw favorable inferences from these facts. 
Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, 
not to override it. Inferences are nothing more than 
the probable or natural explanation of facts. Common 
sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should not 
be permitted to be drawn from routine business trans-
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actions where there are no other circumstances. To hold 
otherwise would throw the door open for attack on each 
and every transaction that one might enter into." Hol-
land vs. Columbia Iron ~fining Company, 4 Utah 2d 
303, 293 Pac 2d 700 ( 1956). 
Apparently Appellant would like this Court to 
believe that in this case there are many facts that don't 
meet the eye. If such facts do exist, why are they not 
in the record? In AbdulKhadir vs. Western Pacific 
Railroad Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 Pac 2d 339, ( 1957), 
this court said: 
"The first attack plaintiff makes upon the 
summary judgment is that the procedure is too 
hasty. He -~mys that if the case had been allowed 
to come to trial in its regular turn on the cal-
endar, he might have been able to produce an-
other witness or witnesses. This contention is 
without merit. The accident happened over a 
year before the motion for summary judgment 
was entered. There was no reasonable assurance 
that the witness referred to, a resident of Cali-
fornia, might be found within a reasonable time, 
or at all, nor that his testimony would help 
plaintiff if available. Speaking generally, it is 
to be assumed that when a plaintiff files his ac-
tion, he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
a right to recover. All he is entitled to is a reason-
able opportunity to marshal and present such 
evidence." 
It is respectfully submitted that a perusal of the 
record herein indicates that no reasonable doubt can 
exist that the appeal in this matter is taken solely for 
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delay, in all respects is frivolous, and Respondent 
suggests that this Court has the discretionary power 
to award further damages to Respondent in the sum 
of 25% of the judgment herein appealed from; Re-
spondent therefore respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm the trial Court and to award Respondent further 
damages because of this frivolous appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUDLEY M. AMOSS 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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